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EXTREMIST THREATS TO FRAGILE
DEMOCRACIES: A PROPOSAL FOR AN EAST
EUROPEAN MARSHALL PLAN
WALTER LAQUEUR, BLACK HUNDRED: THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN
RUSSIA. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. xvii + 317 pp.
PAUL HOCKENOS, FREE TO HATE: THE RISE OF THE RIGHT IN POST-COMMUNIST
EASTERN EUROPE. New York: Routledge, 1993. x + 332 pp.
Reviewed by Victor Williams*
INTRODUCTION
"[I]t is by restoring the economic life of a country, and by this alone,
that we can meet the threat of dictatorship from a Fascist Right or
a Communist Left."'
In this vast struggle which is raging throughout the world for the
minds and loyalties of men, the weakness of the foreign policies of
the democracies lies in the fact that such policy is mostly nega-
tive-it is against something. The communist [neo-fascist] policy,
on the other hand, is positive. The have a program to cure all the ills
of all people everywhere. It is a false program, of course, but anyway
it is something positive....
Communism [and neo-fascism are] but outward manifestation[s]
of the world revolution now in progress-a revolution of the "have
nots," not so much against the "haves," as against their own lot in
life.... There are just too many people... who go to bed cold and
hungry every night to expect that victory in the fight to contain
communism [and neo-fascism] will bring peace to the world.
The free world must shift from the negative to the positive if it
is to win this struggle.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, John Jay College of the City University of New York.
Columbia University Law School, LL.M. Candidate; Ouachita University, B.A. (1980); National-
Louis University, M.A.T. (1982); Harvard University, Ed.M. (1984); University of Oxford, Cert.
of Comp. (1987); University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. (1990).
1. Allen Dulles, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and Founder of the
Committee for the Marshall Plan, Speech at Brown University (1947), in Michael Wala,
Introduction to ALLEN W. DULLES, THE MARSHALL PLAN ix, xxi (1993).
2. GREGORY A. FOSSEDAL, OUR FINEST HOUR: WILL CLAYTON, THE MARSHALL PLAN,
AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 264 (1993) (quoting William L. Clayton, Atlantic Union
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When President Boris Yeltsin recently seized substantial authority
under the newly-ratified Russian Constitution, the Russian Federation
embarked on a turbulent era of constitutional government; extreme
nationalists and communists formed a strong coalition in the Federal
Assembly, thereby alarming all of Europe. This situation began only a
few weeks after Yeltsin defeated the brown-red October 1993 coup led
by Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov.4 After only four months,
the Federal Assembly granted amnesty to the jailed leaders of both the
1993 and 1991 coup attempts. 5 Similarly, in the years since the collapse
of the Iron Curtain, the newly independent States and former Soviet
satellites have experienced a rapid resurgence of ultraright extremist
activity. In this time of cataclysmic social, economic, and political conflict
in Russia6 and the other States of Eastern Europe, Black Hundred: The
Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia and Free to Hate: The Rise of the
Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, both published in 1993,
command most careful examination.7 With the hindsight of more recent
world events, the books clearly illuminate the difficult challenges that lie
ahead of the peoples of Russia and the newly independent States. The
books reveal historical insight and provide contemporary analysis which
will allow scholars, policymakers, and international businesspersons to
assess better the insidious threat that extremists and ultranationalists8 pose
to the fragile democracies of Eastern Europe. Further, readers will be
better able to evaluate proposals, such as this review article's call for an
East European Marshall Plan,9 designed to help postcommunist transforma-
tions and to contain extremist dangers.'0
- The Road to Peace, 1955-56 Int'l Y.B. of the Cotton Trade J.) William Clayton was one
of the chief architects of the Marshall Plan.
3. See Daniel Sneider, Russians Spurn Reformers, Embrace Authoritarianism, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 14, 1993, at 1, 18.
4. See Victor Williams, The Struggle Continues: Khasbulatov's Final Exile: Review of
Ruslan Khasbulatov's The Struggle for Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution,
1 PARKER ScH. J. E. EUR. L. 75 (1994).
5. See Michael Specter, Yeltsin's Top Foes in October Battle Freed from Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at Al. The amnesty vote also ended the prosecutions of twelve leaders
of the August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. See Alessandra Stanley, Russia Congress
Votes to Release Yeltsin Enemies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at Al.
6. See Fred Coleman, New Russia, old realities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 17, 1994,
at 44; Andrew Kopkind, From Russia with love and squalor, NATION, Jan. 18, 1993, at 44.
7. See Daniel Williams, U.S. Forces in Russia Overlooked Nationalism; Policy Preoccupied
with Economy, Yeltsin, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at A33.
8. For an excellent work examining ethnic nationalism, see MICHAEL IGNATIEF, BLOOD
AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993).
9. The name "East European Marshall Plan" is purposefully chosen (over, for example,
"Former-Soviet") to signal a welcoming of all newly independent States, including the former
Soviet republics, into the European family. Likewise, the term "Eastern Europe" is used in its
broadest context to include Russia and all the other States of the former Soviet Union.
10. See Alan Berger, Russia's Bad Dream; Zhirinovsky's Fascism Is Not An Isolated
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This article initially presents a summary review of Walter Laqueur's
Black Hundred and a more detailed analysis of Paul Hockenos's Free to
Hate. It then tests the main themes and assertions of these works against
the recent political events in Russia and the other newly independent
States of Eastern Europe. Finally, the article argues that the West should
immediately develop and implement a full scale recovery program - an
East European Marshall Plan - to provide, substantial economic
transformation assistance for all of the newly independent States of
Eastern Europe. The recovery program is proposed as a strategic necessity
in the West's final victory in the Cold War against communism. It is also
an effective preemptive strike against the'rising tide of the extreme right
in Eastern Europe.
I. Black Hundred: A MODEL OF CONTEMPORARY
RUSSIAN HISTORY AND Free to Hate:
A GUIDED TOUR OF EXTREMIST EASTERN EUROPE
Black Hundred, the latest work of Walter Laqueur," a renowned
scholar of European studies, is a carefully researched and fully-docu-
mented academic text.'2 It presents a sweeping historical account of
Russian nationalism and extremism and provides an invaluable foundation
commentary for understanding the complex legal and contradictory
political developments in Russia and Eastern Europe. 3 Professor Peter
Reddaway has stated that the "book helps to explain much that is other-
wise inexplicable: why for example, the Russian right has been sending
hundreds of volunteers to help its Serbian brothers in their task of 'ethnic
cleansing." "
As the first lengthy work by Paul Hockenos,' 5 Free to Hate is the
perceptive result of Hockenos's ambitious endeavor to analyze the rise of
the extreme right in six States in Eastern Europe: Germany, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania. In his review, David
Phenomenon, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1993, at 69; John Marks, Remembrance of Things Past,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 10, 1994, at 28; Ukraine: Fascists Here Too?, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 18, 1993, at 46 (commenting on the large and growing extremist groups, such as right-wing
forces and neo-Nazi groups, in the newly independent States).
11. Walter Laqueur is Chairman of the International Research Council of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and Editor of the Journal of Contem-
porary History.
12. For a relatively disapproving review of the book, see Richard Pipes, Black Hundred:
The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia, NAT'L REv., Aug. 9, 1993, at 58.
13. Certain texts found in this article's summary review of Black Hundred are also cited
in Victor Williams, Review of Walter Laqueur's Black Hundred, 41 AM. J. CoMp. L. (forth-
coming 1994).
14. Peter Reddaway, The Rising Far Right in Russia, CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, June 30,
1993, at 13.
15. Paul Hockenos is an East European-based journalist.
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Cesarani framed the importance and relevance of Free to Hate: "In every
one of the former communist states in eastern Europe, neo-fascist parties
are reaping between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the vote in local and
national elections. Racist violence and discrimination against ethnic
minorities is endemic." 16
A. Black Hundred: Extremism in the Heart
of the Former Soviet Union
1. The Russian Idea
In the first of its four sections, Black Hundred presents a thoughtful
history of the "Russian idea" and discusses the Russian people's belief in
a manifest destiny and a future of national glory far greater than any
achievable by foreigners.' 7 Laqueur examines the political/journalistic
works of Slavophiles Nikolai Danilevsky and Fyodor Dostoyevsky as
examples of the power and complexity of nineteenth century Russian
nationalist thought.' At the heart of this section, Laqueur analyzes the
emergence and growth of Black Hundred, the nationalist-political
movement from which the book takes its title,' 9 and the role of the Eastern
Orthodox Church and certain fanatical clerics in supporting this effort.2°
This movement was active for almost two decades prior to the 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, supporting acts of "individual terror, such as the
murders of the Duma deputies Gertsenstein and Jollos[,]"2' and administer-
ing the 1905-1906 pogroms which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
Jews.22
Laqueur emphasizes the Black Hundred's anti-Semitic campaign, espe-
cially the movement's use of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,23 to
rally the masses against a purported threat of worldwide Jewish and
16. David Cesarani, Free To Hate: The Rise Of The Right In Post-Communist Eastern
Europe, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'v, Nov. 19, 1993, at 44. The review continues: "Political
conditions there discourage western investment, so leaving potential markets undeveloped. The
harassment of minorities sends waves of refugees toward western Europe, fueling its own right-
wing extremists. At its worst, in former Yugoslavia, the fervid nationalism of the post-
communist regimes can lead to civil war and inter-state conflict." Id.
17. WALTER LAQUEUR, BLACK HUNDRED: THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN RUSSIA
3-16 (1993) [hereinafter BLACK HUNDRED].
18. See id. at 7-14.
19. See id at 16-28.
20. See id. at 45-57.
21. Id at 22.
22. Id. at 21.
23. See NORMAN COHN, WARRANT FOR GENOCIDE (1967).
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masonic conspiracies.2A He also notes the contemporary revival of this
disturbing anti-Semitic crusade:
History is full of fantasies, delusions, and lies, and it would be
possible to dismiss these specific inventions as mere curiosities but
for two circumstances .... By one of these strange twists of history,
German anti-Semitic doctrine, which had been exported to Russia in
the 1880s, was reimported from Russia to Germany after the First
World War .... More relevant in the present context is the fact that
after an eclipse of more than seventy years the slogans of the
extreme right of 1918 resurfaced in a Russia shaken by deep
convulsions in 1990.'
Laqueur concludes the first section by describing the historical nexus
between the extreme right's ideology and certain constructs of Russian
Orthodoxy. He specifically discusses the ultraright's historically effective
use of the Church's teachings about the power of Satanic forces and the
coming of the Antichrist to demonize Jews and other enemies of Russia.
26
Additionally, he notes the contemporary use and further distortion of such
radical religious beliefs: "In recent years many elements of demonology,
and the belief in the Antichrist, have been resurrected in the doctrine of
the Russian far right, not just in the abstract, but with reference to
concrete political enemies, the sinister forces representing Satan." 27
2. Exporting Hate
In the second section of Black Hundred, Laqueur explains that
although the 1917 revolution and formation of the Bolshevik government
initially represented a crushing event for right-wing extremists, Joseph
Stalin, the ultimate communist nationalist, vigorously enforced "Soviet
Patriotism" and gave deadly effect to right-wing, nationalist prejudices
against Jews and foreigners.28 The book emphasizes the significant emigra-
tion of right-wing influence out of Soviet Russia and its intellectual
connection to the rising fascist movement of the 1930s.29 Laqueur
discusses the extent to which "[flacism had a considerable impact in the
Russian 6migr6 community in the late 1920s and the 1930s[,]" especially
24. See BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 29-44.
25. Id. at 31-32.
26. Id. at 45-57.
27. Id. at 57.
28. See id at 61-71.
29. See id. at 72-85.
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among younger 6migrs.3° The work identifies "[s]everal new organi-
zations [that] came into being in the 1920s, mainly consisting of members
of the younger generation, militant in approach ....
Laqueur next advances several decades to discuss the rise of the "Rus-
sian Party" in the Soviet intellectual life of the 1970s, through the
emergence and growth of a school of "village writers," the work of
"Solzhenitsyn and Friends," and the "debate on Slavophilism." 32 He
decodes the official language of Soviet anti-Zionism to show that it
actually was directed against all Jewish peoples and "not a small state in
the Middle East. . . ,33 Laqueur maintains that "[a]n essential ingredient
in the development of the ideology of the extreme right in the postwar
period was anti-Semitism. In contrast to other components it developed
predominantly inside the government and not within the dissident
fringe."' The book explains that "Zionism had been considered an enemy
in the Soviet Union ever since the Revolution of 1917. In the early 1920s,
the last independent Zionist (and Jewish) groups were dissolved and the
militants arrested. 35
Black Hundred notes that in the 1960s a renewed attack was made
against anti-Zionists, but explains that "'[a]nti-Zionism' was a code word
for attacks on Jews and Judaism in general ... 36 Addressing the
contemporary relevance of this ideological development, Laqueur states:
"Seen in retrospect the main historical role of the anti-Zionist campaign
... was to provide some continuity between the old anti-Semitism and
the new. As the era of glasnost dawned, most of the champions of the
anti-Zionist drive could be found in the camp of the extreme right., 3
3. After the Soviet Empire Crumbles
In its third section, Black Hundred warns that the contemporary social
and economic transformation makes the Russian Federation fertile ground
for the resurgence of potent nationalists and dangerous extremist groups. 3
Laqueur provides a thorough understanding of the right's often conflicting
convictions and opinions, including their perception of Russian history as
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 73.
32. See id at 86-105.
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id. at 106.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 110-11.
38. See id. at 119-80.
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being unique,39 their search for a cultural and political-religious heritage
that honors "Holy Russia,"' and their confused opinions about foreign
policy after having been totally unprepared for the empire's "disaster that
took place in 1991 .... 41
The book exposes the lack of any systemic economic vision by the
nationalist movement, noting: "The Russian right has traditionally shown
little interest in economic policy. It has all along expressed its strong
dislikes but it has hardly ever presented viable alternatives."42
Interestingly, the work contrasts the Russian nationalists of the 1990s, who
apparently have little or no developed plans for economic transformation
and who face "an infinitely more difficult challenge: to replace a system
that had proved to be unworkable[,]" with the German Nazis of the 1930s,
who only had "to get an economy that had stalled going again. The
infrastructure still existed-the factories, a skilled workforce, a network
of communications. 43 Although Laqueur avoids depicting the nationalist
movement as a single, indistinguishable mob, he does acknowledge the
common thread of paranoia among diverse enemies:
Students of Russian conservatism have noted its strongly utopian
and metaphysical character; perhaps nowhere else has the right
shown so much disdain for pragmatism and common sense. But the
greatest weakness of Russian right-wing politics and thought-now
even more than in the past-has been its paranoiac style."
Laqueur explains that factual manipulation is the essence of this style, for
the "paranoic will adduce masses of facts, . . . Some of the facts may
well be correct, but then suddenly there will be a quantum jump from one
set of facts to another that is breathtaking and totally irrational. 45
4. Naming Names
In its forth and final section, Black Hundred discusses specific
extremist groups, describing the composition and unique passion of
each.' The Monarchists are described in some historical detail, fr6m the
39. See id. at 119-27.
40. See id. at 127-32.
41. Id. at 143; see also id. at 143-48.
42. Id. at 132.
43. Id. at 138.
44. Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 177.
46. See id at 183-296.
Michigan Journal of International Law
time of the murder of Nikolai II and his family in 1918 to the present.'
Laqueur credits glasnost with creating an environment, after years
of Soviet oppression, that allowed Alexander Solzhenitsyn's The Red
Wheel to reignite the Russian people's interest in the monarchy." After
the creation of the Proslav Constitutional Monarchist Party in November
1989, more than seventy other monarchist organizations were formed,
ranging from groups desiring a constitutionally limited monarchy to those
wishing for a return to absolute Tsarist control. Black Hundred describes
the short duration of the existence of these groups, and the disagreements
within, and splits among, them.49
Laqueur also discusses the unexpected reemergence of the Cossacks
as the "quintessential Russian" horseman defending the Russian border.'
He describes the "extensive persecution" of the Cossacks during the years
of communist rule, noting that some researchers estimate that more than
one million were killed." Laqueur depicts the resurgence of the Cossacks
as "only natural" and their demand for political rehabilitation as "justi-
fied" following the dissolution of the strong central government. 52 He is
careful to describe the Cossacks's relationship with the extreme right as
limited, suggesting that the Cossacks were more of an independent
force. 3
Laqueur also examines the contemporary revival of the Russian
Orthodox Church and commits a significant amount of attention to the
Church leadership's collaboration with the communist government,
especially with the Russian secret service (KGB) during the last four
decades.5" Given the Church's troubling history, Laqueur strongly cau-
tions that the future of the Russian Orthodox Church should not be
"through the power and glory of secular politics." He warns against the
Russian right's appeal to the Church to take "a leading part in a patriotic
revival.""S
The final section also presents Laqueur's opinion of the power of the
56 iracist, anti-Semitic Pamyat society, which is described as being a
47. See id. at 183-92.
48. See id. at 184-85.
49. See id. at 185-92.
50. See id. at 192-94.
51. See id. at 195-96.
52. See id. at 197-203.
53. See id. at 202.
54. See idL at 222-44.
55. Id. at 244.
56. See id. at 204-21.
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precursor "in a field that later on became crowded."5 Laqueur references
specific propagandists 5 and the past activities of individual extremist
politicians,59 such as 1993 coup leader, Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi,
and 1993 election victor, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.60 Although Laqueur
reasons that moderate nationalism may have some positive influence in
solving Russia's present problems by appealing to the "historical and
cultural cohesion of the people, to their common values, to idealism[,]"''
he cautions against the beliefs of the extreme right:
[T]he ideas of the extreme right are not only mad but evil. By
creating foes where none exist, they deflect the energies of the
nation from coping with the real dangers, from where they are most
needed: the immense work of reconstruction. If the ultra-right's
views were to prevail, it could well achieve what neither Hitler nor
Stalin and his successors did: the total ruin of the country.62
B. Free to Hate: Extremism in the Former Soviet-Bloc
1. An Overview of the Region-wide Rise of Extremism
In Free to Hate, Paul Hockenos initially gives an overview of the
"deeply conservative, radical nationalist, and even neo-fascist move-
ments" 63 which have arisen in Russia to compete with political leaders
who seek European union and a successful transition to market democ-
racy:
With communism barely behind them, Eastern Europe's democrats
confronted an adversary more unpredictable and incalculably more
menacing than the unpopular dictatorships that had collapsed like
houses of cards .... A diverse spectrum of right-wing forces sur-
faced in every country, each brandishing nationalist ideologies with
authoritarian and racial underpinnings. A new, charged discourse of
ancestry and tradition, of suffering and fate, of lost territories and
thwarted ambitions replaced the stale rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism.
Along with the national pageantry, some of the now-free press
57. Id. at 221.
58. See id. at 245-51.
59. See id. at 251-71.
60. See id. at 254-57.
61. Id. at 296.
62. Id.
63. PAUL HOCKENOS, FREE TO HATE: THE RISE OF THE RIGHT IN POST-COMMUNIST
EASTERN EUROPE 5 (1993) [hereinafter FREE TO HATE].
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flaunted anti-Semitism and ethnic chauvinism that rivaled the tone
of the interwar years .... On the streets, racist violence erupted
against foreigners, native Roma (Gypsies) and third world students. 6
While acknowledging that the former communist States now boast
constitutional democracies with regular elections and a relatively free
press, Hockenos states that there is still a tension between Western-style
democrats and the ultranationalists:
For nationalists, the termination of Soviet occupation opened the
way for a return to the national traditions and the myths that com-
munism had either swept aside or incorporated into its own ideo-
logical framework. The ghosts of the past reappeared in the garb of
modern democracy, with thinly cloaked philosophies of organic
society, ethnic superiority, and national destiny. Like those of the
past, the nationalisms of postcommunist Eastern Europe inherently
contradict the assumptions of liberal democracy and a united Eu-
rope.65
Perhaps most disturbing is Free to Hate's discussion of the difference
between the actual political success and the degree of acceptance of the
ultraright66 in Western and Eastern Europe. Hockenos states that while the
extreme right appears only on the "periphery of the [West's] political
process[,]" such ultrarightists in Eastern Europe "find themselves squarely
within the political mainstream, if not in power. They are talked about as
'normal' and 'natural' phenomena (like nationalism itself), as part and
parcel of democracy, and not as threats to it."67
Hockenos explains the postcommunist right's forceful opposition to
free market transformation; 68 he also identifies the corresponding problem
64. d at 5.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Hockenos explains that by using the term the "right," he means "undemocratic
movements, ones that fall outside the established parameters of Western Democracy." Id. at 8.
The words "fascist" and "neo-fascist" are labels "for the most extreme of the far right
movements, to those who not only endorse genetic hierarchies, greater national states,
authoritarian regimes, and so forth, but also demand that those theories be put into practice,
either through legislation or extra-parliamentary force." Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Hockenos outlines the right's economic plan:
For Westerners, one of the most confusing aspects of the postcommunist right
is its antipathy to free-market economics. Whatever they may say, nationalists tend
to think of capitalism as a Western (ultimately Jewish) ideology designed to strip the
nation of its wealth and culture. Historically, the nationalist right saw industrial
capitalism and its culture of technology and profit clashing with its folkish eth-
ics .... Nationalists and populists today argue either to slow the pace of privatiza-
tion or, in some cases, to halt it altogether. The "slow approach" is entirely in their
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of economic disorder which has "provided the right with plentiful
ammunition to assault their market-oriented democratic opponents. '
Despite these problems, he criticizes the Western countries for failing to
provide any degree of substantial aid to the struggling States of Eastern
Europe. Even though unemployment in some Eastern European cities
approaches forty percent, the West is described as contributing only about
one-tenth of the amount of assistance which was expected and needed by
the former Soviet satellite States. Even the limited assistance, coupled
with dictates from the West's financial bodies, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), has come at great social cost to
Eastern Europeans:
The International Monetary Fund [] and the World Bank accepted
most of the Eastern Europeans into their ranks at the price of
compliance with their standard guidelines .... All of the
postcommunist governments in Eastern Europe, whether IMF
members or not, have dutifully implemented the general conditions
of the IMF's program .... The austerity packages include massive
cuts in domestic expenditures-from investment to food subsi-
dies-in order to insure that the countries meet their balance-of-
payment targets. Should they fail to meet those preset targets, as
they often do, the IMF freezes access to its reserves.70
Hockenos forcefully concludes. the introductory section by revealing
the threat that Eastern extremism could pose to Western economies and
democracies. He challenges the West to take action in order to deal with
this problem: "As much as the West would like to close its eyes to
Eastern Europe's problems, its own future is inextricably bound with that
of 'the other Europe.' ,71
2. A Six-Nation Analysis
a. Germany's Far-Right United
Free to Hate begins its survey of far-right extremism in Eastern
Europe with two chapters concentrating on the ultraright's predictable
interests. A centralized, managed economy implies a strong state that keeps eco-
nomic power firmly in their hands.
Id. at 12-13.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id. at 17-18.
71. Id. at 20.
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exploitation of the social and economic turmoil in Eastern Europe that has
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. The
first chapter begins with a discussion of the bitter anger and intense
violence directed against foreign workers who had come to Germany in
past years from places as diverse as Vietnam, Croatia, and Angola. These
acts resulted in part because the crash transformation of East Germany to
a market economy forced the closing of a substantial number of East
German factories, causing the unemployment rate to jump from zero to
seven percent. The book describes mob attacks on foreign workers in
various East German cities and details particularly violent attacks that
occured in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lictenhagen.73 The violence was
instituted by skinhead youth, but was supported, and even praised, by
significant numbers of local adults and police authorities. These attacks
were frequent and even came to be expected; they increased ten-fold in
1991 alone. As stated by Hockenos, such violence was also directed
against "Jews, leftists, Roma, the mentally handicapped, and homosexuals
.... ""' The acts were an indication of history repeating itself, as
individuals identified with these groups "found themselves the victims of
popular hatred once again in the united Germany."75
This hatred became systemic as the better-organized West German
ultraright successfully unified with the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR) far right groups:
The West Germans lost no time transferring their structures onto the
local, loosely organized cliques in the East. The more sophisticated,
conspiratorial neo-fascists groups in the GDR quickly integrated
themselves into the West German ultra-right parties. By early 1990,
nearly all of the West parties had formed GDR sister organiza-
tions.... Time and again the recipe for terror proved to be brain
power from the West and muscle from the East.
76
Free to Hate provides a description of the major neofascist groups that
stand to the right of the electorally-successful Republican Party,' pre-
dicting that these extremist groups "could well take big chunks of the vote
72. Id. at 24-28.
73. Id. at 29-3 1.
74. Id. at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 46.
77. Included in this description are the German National Democratic Party, the German
Peoples Union, the Liberal German Workers Party, the National Alternative, and the National-
istic Front. See id. at 51-58.
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from the mainstream parties0 8 in upcoming elections; it warns that "for
those peoples whom the right considers undesirable in the New Germany,
the rule of the mob is already a fact-whether it sits in parliament or
not.
,9
In the second chapter, "East Germany: Fascism in the Anti-Fascist
State," Hockenos exposes the disturbing historical reality that existed
during four decades of Soviet domination of the GDR. The communist
regime never dealt with the grossly racist and anti-Semitic period of
German Nazi control. Rather, each State's Marxist regime expertly
continued the authoritarian repression of National Socialism, while
cultivating its citizens' worst racist and xenophobic tendencies for the
regime's own purposes. ° Hockenos stresses the importance of under-
standing that the seemingly random street violence by skinhead youth has
a distinctively political origin and character:
It was not by chance that one segment of the youth gravitated toward
fascist ideology. The fascistic direction of their initial impulses, well
before the introduction of an explicitly political ideology, attests to
the fertile ground that Stalinist political culture provided for the
growth of right-wing and neo-fascist ideas .... The structures that
the people resented and simultaneously tolerated had become part of
many of their individual consciousnesses.8s
b. Hungarian Hate
In its two chapters dedicated to the radical right in Hungary, Free to
Hate discusses how latent racism, which had been building up for years
during the period of Hungary's communist domination, has exploded
against various non-Hungarian minorities. Ironically, the ultraright has
used the historic exploitation and abuse of ethnic Hungarian minorities in
other East European States, especially in Romania,82 to justify Hungary's
oppression of ethnic minorities. 3 While Hockenos describes this rising
racism as "encompass[ing] the breadth of society[,I"" 4 he charges the
skinhead movement with the most violent expressions of this hatred in
their desire for an ethnically-pure Hungary. 5
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 90-102.
81. Id. at 102-03.
82. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
83. FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 116.
84. Id. at 155.
85. Id at 155-58. Consider the sinister racist and anti-Semitic lyrics of a popular "Skinhead
oi band" song titled "Immigrants Share," as quoted by Hockenos:
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Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that although it is the
skinheads and the neo-Nazis who are openly brutal, "similar but more
muted sentiments permeate deep into Hungary's halls of power."86 The
Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) use clas-
sically-nationalistic rhetoric to achieve electoral successes; also, the HDF
has "called upon another familiar ghost from Hungary's historical chest"
- anti-Semitism. Another political group, the Forum, presents itself as
the party representing the true, pure Hungary against the corrupting
influence of the Jewish "dwarf minority."7
These two chapters consistently demonstrate that ultraright politicians
have based their electoral success on declarations of Hungarian or Magyar
superiority and on the damnation of all non-Hungarian minorities.
Hockenos notes that ultraright elected officials have felt at liberty to
announce even the most radical of fascist beliefs in public, and illustrates
with quotes by former HDF Vice-President Istvdn Csurka:
We must end the unhealthy practice of blaming the Skinheads for
all that is bad among the youth, while leniently tolerating other sick-
nesses, crimes, and cultural crimes. We can no longer recoil from the
fact that there are also genetic reasons behind degeneration. We must
acknowledge that disadvantaged strata and groups of our society have
been with us for too long, groups where the severity of natural
selection has not worked .... 88
What is disturbing is the fact that the book describes the HDF party as
center-right and notes that other even more extreme groups exist and are
developing in Hungary.89
In examining Hungary's bureaucracy, Free to Hate contrasts East Ger-
many's and Hungary's transitions away from communist rule. While most
East German communist "apparatchiks" were replaced with West German
democratic personnel, in Hungary and other formerly communist States,
We'll get rid of everyone we don't need,
Including the garbage immigrants.
The immigrants' fate can only be death,
We'll have to drive out all of the Blacks,
For the Arabs-to be sure-machine guns are waiting,
Over Palestine atomic clouds are gathering.
Id. at 156. Similar songs of hate are directed against the Roma community and advocate the
extermination of all gypsy adults and children. Id.
86. Id. at 160.
87. Id. at 111.
88. Id. at 160 (quoting Istvdn Csurka).
89. In June 1993, Csurka was expelled from the HDF; he formed the Hungarian Justice
Party, which is expected to play a significant role in future elections. See id. at 144.
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the governments' bureaucrats are the "same people appointed, trained, and
promoted under communism."' 9 As the worst example of this authoritarian
continuity, Hockenos describes a detention camp for unpopular aliens in
the village of Kerepestarcsa. During World War U, this prison camp was
used to confine Jews, and afterwards the communists used it to imprison
various enemies of the socialist State. Presently, the camp is being used
to detain unfavored "refugees, immigrants, illegal residents, temporary
residents, and even students and tourists... ." Free to Hate quotes human
rights advocate Eva Blenesi: "The only thing that has really changed at
Kerepestarcsa over the years has been the color of its inmates .... "'
The book's conclusion of its substantive review of the Hungarian far
right is more hopeful and positive. Hockenos discusses: The September
1992 demonstration by over 50,000 Hungarians against racist violence and
ultraright extremism; the fact that Hungarian President Arpid G6ncz has
personally apologized to groups of foreign guests for past violence; and
the fact that the three liberal political parties in Hungary have taken strong
antiracist stands. The book also notes that the Roma gypsy community has
coalesced to form a forum which order to promote democratic ideas, and
that two Roma candidates have been elected to the Hungarian Parliament.'
c. Ceausescu's Revenge in Romania
Free to Hate's discussion of the rise of the ultraright in Romania
begins with a description of the "fierce explosion" of ethnic hatred
against the Hungarian minority living in Tirgu-Mures, Transylvania. This
internal violence erupted just three months after Romania's violent 1989
revolution, when President Nicolae Ceausescu's communist nationalist
dictatorship was overthrown. In response to postrevolutionary demands
by the Hungarian minority for greater freedom and autonomy, the
violence against the ethnic Hungarians "signaled only a first stage of a
nationalistic groundswell . . . ."' The ultranationalist group Vatra
Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth), which led the 1990 Transylvania attacks
against the Hungarian minority, has continued to grow in popular and
political influence, along with numerous other far-right groups including
the nationally-based Romania Mare.9 These groups presently direct their
90. id. at 161.
91. Id. at 164.
92. Id. at 164-65.
93. Id. at 169. The book details the competing historical claims of Hungarians and
Romanians to Transylvania from the first century to the time of the Turkish occupation, and
up until Romania's temporary World War II loss of the region to Hungary. See id. at 171-74.
94. Id. at 189-96.
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hatred toward the Hungarian and Roma minorities, and the small minority
of Jews remaining in Romania. The groups especially target the Roma
minority which has been moderately successful in taking advantage of
free market reforms for commercial purposes.95
Hockenos compares the political message of the Romanian far right
with their Russian counterpart, Pamyat: "The Romanian ultra-nationalists
pander to the same sentiment to rally opposition against market reforms,
European integration, foreign investment, the United Nations, and demo-
cratic opposition parties." 96 He relates that in September 1992, two far-
right parties joined their sometimes-ally, the Socialist Labor Party (suc-
cessor to the Communist Party), using isolationist political messages to
achieve a combined fifteen percent of the parliamentary vote, representing
a significant force in the fractured Romanian legislature.
Perhaps most symbolic of the far right's growing intellectual hold
upon the State is their successful effort to rehabilitate the collective
memory of Romania's brutal Axis-allied military dictator, Marshal Ion
Antonescu. "Politicians and the press alike" 97 are almost unanimous in
their praise for the dictator, even though his "four year rule sent over
300,000 of Romania's nearly 800,000 Jews and tens of thousands of
Romas to their deaths.. . ."98 In Romania today, the far right has been
successful in remaking Antonescu into a Romanian hero in the minds of
the great majority of the people. 99
The chapter on Romania concludes with a worst-case scenario discus-
sion of the "regional fragmentation and instability" involving Eastern
Bessarabia, also known as Moldovia, warning: "The nationalist dynamic
that Romanian radicals have set in motion on Romania's eastern and
western frontiers could facilitate the country's internal combustion,
perhaps bringing some kind of military dictatorship to power in order to
hold the country together by force."'"
95. See id. at 202-03.
96. Id. at 184.
97. Id. at 186.
98. Id. at 187. Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem is quoted for a description of how
even German SS officers were shocked at Antonescu's brutal treatment of Jews: "In Romania
even the SS were taken aback, and occasionally frightened by the horrors of old-fashioned,
spontaneous pogroms on a gigantic scale; they often intervened to save Jews from sheer
butchery ..... Id.
99. To attempt to understand the hatred directed against minorities in Romania, Free to
Hate points to the suggestion by Romanian democrats of the "complete neglect of morality and
moral values in communist Romania." Id. at 204.
100. Id. at 207.
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d. Czech and Slovak UltraNationalism
Hockenos mourns the break up of Czechoslovakia as the loss of a
"positive, democratic example" of a multiethnic model State for Eastern
Europe.' ' Symbolically, only one chapter is committed to the success of
the extreme right in the "diverse picture of Czech and Slovak societies"
and polities.' m The chapter initially presents a concise history of the
united Czechoslovakia beginning from the first republic (1918-1938)
founded by Thomas Masaryk, to the time of Nazi domination under the
German protectorate, onto over forty years of communist tenure including
the crushed bloom of the Prague Spring, then to the 1989 Velvet Revolu-
tion, and finally to the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia into two
independent States. 3
It is ironic that the leading far-right political group in the newly inde-
pendent Czech Republic, the Republican Party, shares Hockenos's affinity
for the boundaries of the old Czechoslovakia, albeit for different reasons.
This group fought dissolution and argues for reunification of Czechoslo-
vakia under the leadership of Miroslav Sladek, a self-described "Czecho-
slovak nationalist."''" While early support for the Republican Party was
limited to skinheads, in the 1992 elections, Sladek broadened his groups'
support to garner 600,0*00 votes and eleven seats in the 200-member
Czech National Council.'05 The Republican Party's electoral success may
have resulted from its consistent demands for the government to expel the
over 46,000 foreign guest workers from Czechoslovakia. In their econom-
ic policy goals, the Republicans are allied with the Communist Party of
Moravia and Bohemia against privatization efforts. What Hockenos
describes as the far right's "beer hall nationalism" takes a more fierce
appearance when violently enforced by the skinheads against Vietnamese
workers"° and against the Romas'07 in the name of helping maintain law
and order.
101. Id. at 236.
102. Id. at 213. See Igor Hdjek, Czech Culture in the Cauldron, 46 EUR.-AsIA STUD. 127
(1994).
103. See FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 212-16.
104. Id. at 226-28.
105. Id. at 224-25.
106. The book presents the disturbing history of how tens of thousands of Vietnamese
workers were sent to Czechoslovakia in the 1970s as "payment" in service for the North
Vietnamese debt to the communist State. Id. at 218-19.
107. The book discusses the forced sterilization of gypsy women under the communists,
quoting from a 1992 Helsinki Watch study of continued abuses against Czechoslovakia's Roma
population. See id. at 219-20.
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Meanwhile in the newly independent Slovakia, far-right leaders have
wasted no time, according to Hockenos, in attempting to push the State
"the way of the Balkans"'"8 in promoting ethnic conflict. While ethnic
Hungarians comprised only three percent of the united republic, the
600,000 Hungarians living in Southern Slovakia comprise over ten
percent of the Slovak State."° Now that Slovakia is independent, it is
separated from Western trade and faces massive unemployment.
Ultraright forces, such as the Slovak's Peoples Party and the Slovak Na-
tionalistic Party, have fertile ground in which to grow. Even more than
in the Czech Republic, skinheads are politically active in most nationalist
parties, and they are violently aggressive against foreign students and the
Roma community."0
e. Polish Populist Angst
Free to Hate begins its analysis of Poland with the chapter "Poland:
Christ of Nations," praising the inclusive "civil society" basis of Solidari-
ty's ten-year opposition to the Communist Party's repression and domina-
tion. In assessing Poland's postcommunist life, however, Hockenos
determines that the Polish Catholic Church is the most important influ-
ence on Polish politics and particularly notes the Church's strong distrust
of liberalism. Hockenos frames the Polish far right in terms of a move-
ment of populism, stating: "To its discredit, postcommunist Poland has
proven a fruitful breeding ground for populisms, which have blazed
spectacularly before fizzling out and dissipating into the thin air from
which they came."''. The 1991 presidential campaign of "self-made
millionaire" Staislaw Tyminiski and his "Party X" is described not as a
fluke, but as a most disturbing example of populism."2
Another populist group is the still-active Confederation for Inde-
pendent Poland founded in 1979 under the leadership of Leszek
Moczuldi, who pridefully boasted of never having compromised with the
communists. This Party is currently described as much more moderate
than other ultraright Polish groups, such as the National Party which is
openly anti-Semitic and popular with Polish skinheads." 3 Because Po-
land's economic woes only seem to increase with staggering inflation
108. Id. at 231.
109. Id. at 233-34.
110. Id. at 235.
111. Id. at 261.
112. Id. at 260-62.
113. Id. at 266-67.
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rates and debilitating worker strikes, the book predicts continued growth
of more organized extremism both from the right and left.
1 4
3. The Paradox of Anti-Semitism in an
Eastern Europe Without Jews
In a separate and final chapter, Hockenos collectively explores the
substantial resurgence of open anti-Semitism in all of the States included
in his East European survey. The chapter opens with demographic
information as to how relatively few Jews currently live in Eastern
Europe (excluding Russia), l" 5 and it expresses disbelief that open anti-
Semitism could again be accepted in Eastern Europe after the "incompre-
hensible horror of the Holocaust . ,,16 While the author describes
public anti-Semitism in Western Europe as limited and "a social taboo,"
he states that it "is alive and flourishing throughout Eastern Europe, even
in the virtual absence of Jews. As before WWII, anti-Semitism is a staple
of the far right movements, central to their way of thinking, if not
explicitly to their programs."'" 7 Far from having "sympathy toward the
remaining Jews," significant numbers of Eastern Europeans (from one-
fifth to nearly one-half) harbor anti-Semitic attitudes. The most extreme
anti-Semites resort to vandalizing cemeteries when there are too few Jews
living in their communities to harass." 8
Equally disturbing is the fact explained by Free to Hates that
postcommunist anti-Semitism is often used by the right as a symbolic
weapon again all Western, liberal, or democratic ideas or concepts, such
as capitalism: "The nationalist gutter presses from Moscow to Bratislava
routinely link the IMF to the 'Jewish world conspiracy.' ,19
The Eastern European ultranationalists have a sweepingly revisionist
conception of history with a resulting "reversal of guilt" regarding the
Holocaust:
In Eastern Europe, the frank, self-critical admission of wrongdoing
seems far beyond the means of nations whose self-esteem was further
maligned by four decades of communism. It implies sacrificing their
114. Id. at 268-69.
115. Id. at 271. After the Holocaust and the anti-Zionist purges under communism, the
number of Jews living in non-Soviet Eastern and Central Europe were reduced from five
million to just over 125,000, with the largest number living in Hungary. d.
116. Ud.
117. Id. at 272.
118. Id. at 272-74.
119. Id. at 282.
Michigan Journal of International Law
inflated myths of past glory and goodness, their nation's noble
struggle against injustice, foreign invasion, and occupation.
In Eastern Europe today, these myths are the very cornerstones
of the nationalist regimes' legitimacy. They are also one of the last
ostensibly noble things that many people have left to feel good about.
The existence of these historical black spots force the culpable to try
all the harder to reverse the victim-persecutor relationship.' 2
Free to Hate explores further the "anti-Semitic mind" by related meth-
odological details of a 1991-1992 research study of Slovian anti-Semitism
completed by the American Jewish Committee in cooperation with several
Czechoslovakian research institutes. The survey resulted in "a descriptive
anatomy of the right-wing personality in Eastern Europe, of the potential
fascist." 12' This chapter concludes that anti-Semitism has "reemerged in
Eastern Europe primarily as a political weapon, and its potence, as well
as the contents of its message, shed an alarming light on the nature of
postcommunist political culture.""
Finally, Hockenos returns to the issue of the West's inadequate and
somewhat insulting level of actual assistance to the struggling States of
Eastern Europe:
What Eastern Europe needs most today is a comprehensive eco-
nomic aid package from the West, which, despite its own economic
malaise, could afford to be far more generous than it has been....
Significant aid could also go toward rebuilding infrastructure and
protecting the environment. Almost all of the Eastern European
governments have massive debts hanging over their heads, which the
West could forgive or offer moratoriums on until the Eastern
economies stabilize. 23
Hockenos also stresses the importance of free trade within Eastern Europe,
as well as trade between the East and West. This is particularly important
given the collapse of the Comecon trading bloc. Hockenos calls for
Western Europe to "fully embrace the Eastern Europeans as the full
citizens of a united Europe[,] 'J " and for the West "to incorporate the new
democracies into its security structure."'25 The long-term strategic benefits
120. Id. at 288.
121. Id. at 297.
122. Id. at 299.
123. Id. at 314-15.
124. Id. at 316. The reality is that the European Union has raised, not lowered, trade barriers
in response to increased exports from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. See
id. at 315.
125. Id. at 316.
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to the West of such an embrace are obvious:
Rapid integration of the Eastern Europeans into the EC would
stimulate Eastern economies and work toward staunching the flow
of immigration, as well as giving the West critical leverage over the
new members on issues of human rights, democracy, and the
environment. Instead of forcing the Eastern European governments
to abide by unrealistic economic demands, the West should make aid
and investment contingent upon, high standards of minority rights,
freedom of the press, and free elections.'2
The costs of a continued policy of Western exclusion of, indifference to,
and inadequate assistance for Eastern Europe would be severe: "The
West's failure to respond constructively to the new realities in Eastern
Europe has nowhere been more blatant that in former Yugoslavia."' 27
Hockenos believes that, "[t]he Serbs' conquests send a clear message to
the far right in every country-from France to Russia-that success is
within their grasp."128 Noting that political and economic crises in the West
may make it more susceptible to the spread of extremist viruses, the author
reminds the reader that the problem of the far right is not one of "a couple
of thousand Skinheads, but of the latent prejudices and sentiments that they
express in their most extreme forms, and that right-wing parties have
shown themselves deft at exploiting."'' 29 Free to Hate concludes by
admonishing the West not to take the past four decades of equilibrium for
granted: "The fates of both Europes are intricately bound, and they must
work together if the Europe of the past is not to be the Europe of the
future."' 
30
II. TESTING Black Hundred AND Free to Hate AGAINST EASTERN
EUROPE'S MOST RECENT "TIME OF TROUBLES"
Juxtaposing Black Hundred's and Free to Hate's basic themes with
the most recent events that have occured in Eastern Europe reveals the
excellence of Walter Laqueur's and Paul Hockenos's historical research
and contemporary analysis. Regrettably, the works' substantial concern
with the resurgence of anti-Semitism and racism has already proven
justified. Additionally, Black Hundred's calculation of the high probability
for the development of "an authoritarian system based on some nationalist
126. 1d
127. Id. at 317.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 318.
130. Id.
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populism" in Russia appears on its way to being proven correct by the
success of the brown-red coalition in the December 1993 election and by
the ratification of a constitution weighted heavily in favor of an authoritari-
an executive. Free to Hate's early indictment of the West's use of the IMF
and World Bank as the primary sources of limited and insufficient aid has
also proven correct in both Eastern Europe and Russia, and Hockenos's
prediction of nationalist politicians winning concrete political power has
already been realized. The reader is left only to hope that Laqueur's
reluctant prediction that "a Fuhrer or a duce" will appear to ensure the
growth and success of Eastern European fascism proves unjustified.
A. A Warning Against Anti-Semitism
The most prevalent and corresponding theme of Black Hundred and
Free to Hate is the disturbing revelation of the existence of anti-Semitism
and racism in the postcommunist world.'3 ' In menacing and odious detail,
both Laqueur and Hockenos give numerous examples of such hatred,
including, as noted above, the successful republishing and sale of The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion.'32 Numerous incidents of Russian anti-
Semitic violence and aggression occurring before the October 1993 coup
also confirmed the concerns raised by Black Hundred. Terrorism against
synagogues,"' attacks in the streets against rabbis,"34 and innumerable
assaults and insults against individuals have occurred all too frequently. 35
Black Hundred also includes actual reproductions of atrocious cartoons
131. The rising anti-Semitism in Russia has contributed, in recent months, to a significant
exodus of Jews from Russia. See Israeli Minister Sees Rising Exodus of Russia [sic] Jews,
REUTERS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 1; cf. Greg McIvor, Sweden: Deportation of Former Soviet Jews Goes
Ahead, Inter Press Service, Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
132. It is telling that the most frequently-cited work in Pamyat publications is The Protocols.
See BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 205. See generally Semyon Reznik, Threatening Russian
Jews again, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at A19. Interestingly, The Protocols recently was
declared a forgery by a Moscow district court judge in connection with a libel suit against
Pamyat. See Michael A. Hiltzik, Russia Rules Anti-Semitic Tract a Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
28, 1993, at A1, All.
133. See Matthew Campbell, Neo-Nazis Rise Amid Ruins of Soviet Union, SUNDAY TIMES,
June 27, 1993; Chief Rabbi in Moscow Tells of Vandalism at Synagogue, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1993, at A15.
134. See Anti-Semitism Rearing Its Ugly Head in Russia, NPR Morning Edition, Aug. 11,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
135. See Andrew Borowiec, Study sees anti-Semitism spreading in Europe, WASH. TIMES,
July 3, 1993, at A9. Systemic anti-Semitic actions from institutional sources were even more
disturbing. Consider the comments of Canon Michael Bordeaux regarding anti-Semitism within
the Russian Orthodox Church: "I have heard Russian bishops come out with anti-semitic remarks
which would be totally unacceptable in a western society, and they are not even aware of what
they're saying. There is anti-semitism. It's there in Russian society," quoted in Christian Tyler,
Private View: The Man Who Put Religion Back. In Russia, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at xxiv.
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and caricatures taken from recently-published right-wing journals. These
racist, anti-Semitic, and antihomosexual caricatures appear in prominent
journals having a significant circulation. An exhaustive listing and
circulation records of such Russian right-wing, nationalist, and anti-Semitic
journals are included in Black Hundred's Bibliographic Note. 136
Laqueur's emphasis on the resurgence of the Cossacks is well placed
because this group is also known for its institutional promotion of anti-
Semitism. The Cossacks may appear more harlequin than dangerous to
the Western eye, however, they remain anti-Semitic: "They still wear their
big, furry wool hats, their long green tunics and their royal blue pants with
distinctive red stripe. They still brandish long swords and like to ride
horses when mounting an attack. They still despise foreigners and
especially, Jews."' 37
When right-wing extremists joined with communists to create a brown-
red coalition in October 1993, endangering the stability and civil peace
of the Russian Federation,' 38 virulent anti-Semitic verbiage was shouted
by the armed mobs outside the Ostankino television station and the
mayor's office.' 39 Attacks against Jews and Jewish institutions continued
during the election period and into the new year.' 40 Indeed, following
election victories by the Liberal Democratic Party, Ignatz Bubis, the
President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, predicted a renewed
Jewish exodus from Russia of "several thousand."'
' 41
The right-wing political leader, "Zhirinovsky[,] makes considerable
play out of the Russians' deepseated resentment of the Jews. What is most
136. See BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 302-06.
137. Howard Witt, The Cossacks Ride-Again In Russia, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1994, at 1.
138. See Justin Burke, Russian Fringe Forms Core of Armed Parliament Defenders,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1993, at 3.
139. See Howard Witt & James P. Gallagher, Riot Leaders Are Steeped in Old Hates, CH.
TRIB., Oct. 4, 1993, at NI.
140. Moscow Jews anxious after suspect synagogue fire, Agence France Presse, Jan. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. It is unfortunate that Yeltsin and other reformers
have not actively confronted anti-Semitism in Russia, even after arson fires destroyed both the
Lubavitch Jewish Day School and the Marina Toscha Synagogue in January 1994. Some Yeltsin
advisors even employed anti-Semitic politics in attempting to discredit Vladimir Zhirinovsky
by continuing the "rumor" that Zhirinovsky's father was Jewish, at the same time that Yeltsin
was making assurances that he was ready to denounce anti-Semitism publicly. Although such
conflicting statements might be considered normal Russian "political ambiguity," Nathasha
Singer, Moscow Bureau Chief of The Forward, recently restated Black Hundred's exposition
of Russian anti-Semitism: "In a country that has a history of scapegoating Jews-from the Black
Hundred Pogroms to the blood libel charge against Hassidic Jews leveled last year by
Pravda-such ambiguity has dangerous precedents." Natasha Singer, Yeltsin's Silence Encourages
the Haters, INT'L HERALD Tim., Jan. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
141. German Jewish leader fears new exodus from Russia, Agence France Presse, Dec.
14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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worrying about the Zhirinovsky phenomenon is how quickly many of his
ideas will be absorbed into the mainstream."' 42 Predictably, Zhirinovsky
responded to the charge that the Liberal Democratic Party is anti-Semitic
by blaming the victim, stating: "At a certain stage of development, a wave
of antisemitism arises. But we don't want this to happen. This is provoked
by those who consider themselves part of the Jewish nation. We don't need
provocation like this."' 43 The emphasis that Black Hundred also places on
the Pamyat Society in connection with the rising level of open anti-
Semitism appears most accurate.'"
The warning of Free to Hate regarding anti-Semitism in the former
Soviet bloc States has also proven correct. In February 1994, Edgar M.
Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, testified to the U.S.
House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that anti-Semitism
is especially disturbing in Hungary and Romania:
In Hungary two weeks ago, the leaders of the Jewish community
made an appeal for help in a leading daily newspaper to combat
resurgent anti-Semitics. This followed bomb scares at synagogues and
a home for the elderly, the breakup of a neo-Nazi group by the police
and the launch of investigation into another anti-Semitic party, the
VNP.
In Romania, despite repeated protests by the Jewish community
against anti-Semitic incidents, anti-Semitism in the media and the
rehabilitation of the war time leader Antonescu under who up to
300,000 Jews perished, practically no action has been taken. On 24
January Romanian television was able to broadcast, with impunity,
a programme on Antonescu which stated that Jews had assassinated
142. John Kampfner, Focus Russia; Vlad, Bad and Dangerous To Know, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 19, 1993, at 25.
143. Lee Hockstader, Zhirinovsky Vows to Seek Yeltsin's Job; Nationalist Blames Jews for
Prejudice, WASH. POsT, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al. See also Joseph Albright & Marcia Kunstel,
Zhirinovsky - Russia's 'Frightening Fascist', ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 6, 1994, at A8.
144. Consider the following official Pamyat statement issued in late January 1994:
The country's situation today is a result of the systematic fulfillment of the gory plans
of conspiracy against Russia. Dmitry Vasiliev stated almost 10 years ago that the
secret programs of "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" were being put into effect
in our homeland. Today it is clear that the program has been implemented clause by
clause. The only cure for the infested Russia is strong power that would rely on the
millennium old tradition and revive the state on the foundations of a firm Russian
Orthodox Faith. To this end the President and the Government must give up their
cosmopolitan views and pro-Western reforms and come to rely on the healthy national
forces.
Extracts From A Press Conference by Pamyat (Memory) Society Head, Official Kremlin Int'l
News Broadcast, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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Romanian officers and soldiers in 1940 and that this explained the
measures against Jews taken by the government. 45
Bronfman concluded his testimony by quoting Conor Cruise O'Brien for
the construct that "Anti-Semitism is a light sleeper."14
6
B. Extremism's Potential for Harm in All Eastern Europe
Both Black Hundred and Free to Hate predict that extremists and
ultranationalists threaten to exhaust Russia of the energy and resources that
it desperately needs to persevere during the coming difficult times of
transformation. The Russian October 1993 brown-red coup and the
December 1993 election results indicate that there is a concrete potential
for disruption and discord.47 In the first free national legislative vote in
Russia since the 1917 Revolution, the extremist Liberal Democratic Party
received twenty percent of the popular votes cast for the 225 seats in the
lower house of the Russian parliament.148 With a significant and disturbing
percentage of support from the military, 49  Vladimir Wolfovich
Zhirinovsky'- ° was able to form at least an obstreperous, and more likely
a significantly destructive, brown-red coalition 51 in the Federal Assembly,
with the power to frustrate the important business of reform. 52
Embarking on a new, uncharted era of constitutional rule in Russia,
the potential for harm has dramatically increased. Following the December
1993 election, Yeltsin's government took an antireformist turn, 5' resulting
145. Testimony February 8, 1994 of Edgar M. Bmnfman, Federal Document Clearing
House, Feb. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
146. Id.
147. See Harley Balzer, Putting Russia's October Revolution to Rest, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 13, 1993, at 19; Parliament's defenders; Mass misjudgment, ECONOMIST, Oct.
9, 1993, at 55.
148. See Weimar on the Volga, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 45.
149. See Wendy Sloane, Nationalism Plays Well In Russian Army Barracks, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 30, 1993, at 6; Craig R. Whitney, Russian Rightist Angers Germans, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1993, at AS.
150. Zhirinovsky's extremism may be judged by his own extreme words. See Zhirinovsky's
A-Z, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 46. See also Who Is Zhirinovsky? Mystery Shrouds Russian
Nationalist, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1993, at Al.
151. See Leyla Boulton & John Lloyd, Yeltsin's Foes Unite In Parliament's First Session:
Ultra-nationalists Set To Work With Communists, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at 26. See also
Gorbachev Tied to Zhirinovsky?: Exleader Reportedly Ordered KGB to Fund 'Alternative Party',
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at A27.
152. See Carrol Bogert & Dorinda Elliott, The Laughing Fascist, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 1993,
at 26.
153. See Marcia Kasbul & Joseph Albright, No. 2 Man in Russian Wants Slower Reform
and He's Growing in Influence, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 26, 1994, at AS; Moscow's Retreat
From Reform: Finance Minister Rejects Yeltsin; Predicts Disaster, CHI. Tam,, Jan. 27, 1994,
at 1.
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in the loss of key economic reformers from the government.'-' Finance
Minister Boris Fyodorov left the government, despite Yeltsin's personal
request that he remain in office, after the government reversed reformist
policies by what Fyodorov termed an "economic coup" by "Red economic
managers."'' 5 Further, in response to nationalist pressure, the Russian
government is taking a significantly more aggressive military policy
towards former Soviet States, 56 sateflites,15 7 and other States.' 8 These
startling postelection results 159 are not such a surprise. Black Hundred's
concluding chapter states:
It is easy to think of reasons that seem to favor the growth of some
extreme nationalist movement-the feeling of national humiliation
following the breakup of the Soviet Union; the need to pursue an
assertive policy vis-A-vis the former republics in view of Russian
interests and the presence of many millions of Russians abroad; the
bad economic situation and the need to engage in unpopular reforms;
the frequent impotence of the authorities in the face of a breakdown
of law and order; the fact that democratic institutions are not deeply
rooted in Russia; the traditional psychological need for a strong hand;
the old Weimar dilemma of how to run a democracy in the absence
of a sufficient number of democrats; the deep divisions on the left.'60
Similarly, Free to Hate's warning that the far right is a significant threat
to the successful economic and political transformation of the other States
of Eastern Europe deserves attention:
The new fascisms in Europe are genuine, organized, and intercon-
nected political movements grounded in prejudices and bigotry which
penetrate to the heart of society. If the democratization of Eastern
Europe is going to succeed, it requires a confrontation with and
redefinition of these political cultures and the cultivation of modem
democratic values to supplant those of the past.' 6'
154. Steven Erlanger, Finance Minister Shuns Yeltsin Plea and Quits Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 1994, at Al.
155. Russian Reformer's Words: "Economic Coup", N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at A6.
156. See, e.g., Misha Glenny, The bear in the Caucasus: From Georgian Chaos, Russian
Order, HARPER'S, Mar. 1994, at 45.
157. See Celestine Bohlen, National Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1994, at A4.
158. See Richard Pipes, Sunday Comment: Russia hots up the new Cold War, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 27, 1994, at 29.
159. See David Broder, A 'Success Story' Gone Sour, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at C7.
160. BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 293-94.
161. FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 304.
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Recent social 62 and political events' 63 in all of Eastern Europe have
justified Hockenos's severe and serious admonition. One such example
is Hungary's recent decision to normalize relations with Serbia, after years
of Western indecision regarding Bosnian violence, in order to try to protect
ethnic Hungarians in the bordering Serbian region of Vojvodina. The
decision was described as coming "on the heels of Hungarian disappoint-
ment with the Partnership for Peace security plan, seeming Western
deference to Russia in the region, and a perception of declining United
States commitment to Europe .... "164 The Hungarian government,
pressured by internal ultraright forces, responded to the "gap between
Western action and rhetoric over the past four years.1 65
Free to Hate's prediction that the extreme right is within striking
distance of solidifying its political power is also proving correct. In
February 1994, after months of rising labor unrest, fourteen percent
unemployment, and 300% annual inflation, extreme Romanian nationalists
won "coalition" status within the government. As of March 1, 1994,
representatives of the Romanian National Unity and the Greater Romanian
Party formally joined the government.66 The leader of the Greater
Romanian Party, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, is the former "court-poet" to
Ceausescu, and is openly antiSemitic.' 67 These most recent events
demonstrate that it would be naive for the West to imagine that successful
transformations can be easily achieved by postcommunist States or and
that such changes can result absent significant Western financial, intellectu-
al, and political assistance.'
68
162. See William McPherson, The Transylvania Tangle, WIoLSN's Q., Winter 1994, at 59.
163. See, e.g., Gwynne Dyer, Trouble Spots; The devil is loose in Eastern Europe, with
war likely on many fronts, GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 9, 1994, at B3. Nationalism is on the rise
world wide. See WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS: CIVILIZATIONS AND THE FURY OF
NATIONALISM (1993).
164. Hungarian Realpolitik, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14, 1994, at 22.
165. Id. A related analysis was recently made of all of Eastern Europe:
Consider the dismal performance of the western democracies in face of the rise of
ultranationalism in Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. It repeats
in almost uncanny detail the failure of those same democracies to act in time against
the same phenomena in the 1930s. And unless we are very lucky it many have a
horribly similar outcome: a devastating European war.
John Bierman, NATO leaders ignore history at their own peril, FIN. POST, Feb. 11, 1994, at
11.
166. Tony Barber, Romania far right gets taste of power, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 3, 1994, at
13.
167. In an open letter to President Iliescu last year, Tudor stated: "'Jews give you orders.
Jews brought you to power and keep you at the top, at the price of ruining Romania."' Id.
168. For interesting commentary on the complexity of such transformations, see Richard
Rose & Christian Haerpfer, Mass Response to Transformation in Post-communist Societies, 46
EUR.-ASIA STUD. 3 (1994); Stanislaw Gomulka, Economic and Political Constraints During
Transition, in id. at 89.
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C. Russia's New Constitutional Era: A Check on Extremism or A Legal
Framework for Authoritarianism and
Imperial Fascist Expansionism?
In redeclaring Russia's "strong State" tradition during his 1994 State
of the Federation speech, Boris Yeltsin reminded the West of the continued
preeminence of Russia's military and political presence in Eastern
Europe. 169 While it is a fact that the newly-ratified Russian Constitution
vests Yeltsin with substantial authority for reform policies, 7 ° which could
be used to limit the influence, restrain the activities, or retard the political
maturation of extremism,"' the extent to which Yeltsin will be able to
exercise this authority effectively remains unclear, especially with less than
an absolute commitment of support from military and security forces.'7
What is certain about this new constitutional order is the potential threat
to the future security of the world if an ultra-nationalist, such as
Zhirinovsky, is elected President in 1996. With the backing of the military,
the secret police, and various communist groups, such an individual may
corrupt the Constitution's heavily-weighted executive powers'73 to institute
a constitutional brand of authoritarian, national socialism.
174
169. John Lloyd, Yeltsin signals a return to strong state traditions, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1994, at 1; John Lloyd, Firm Yeltsin line offers little joy for West, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994,
at 3.
170. See Framework or frame-up, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 47.
171. Yeltsin freely used executive powers before the election. See David Hearst, Yeltsin
Threatens to Switch Off 'Critical' Broadcasts; Opposition Summoned to Kremlin and Told Not
to Attack Constitution, GUARDIAN, Nov. 27, 1993, at 12; Lee Hockstader, Yeltsin Seeks
Presidential Vote Delay; Russian Reverses Vow To Face Voters in June, Rules Out 2nd Term,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at Al, A47.
172. Dimitri Simes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace expertly frames
the potential political stalemate between Yeltsin and the extremists in the Duma:
Of course, Yeltsin may attempt to treat the Parliament as an irrelevant nuisance,
relying on the powers of the extremely strong presidency created by the newly adopted
constitution to rule in Russia .... Should Yeltsin attempt to dissolve the parliament
again by decree, Vladimir Thirinovsky's impressive vote count among military
personnel raises the specter of civil war in a nuclear power. And Yeltsin's new
opponents are not likely to be as isolated-or as easy to defeat-as defenders of the
old congress.
Dimitri Simes, America's Misdirected [Policy], WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1993, at A23. See also
Dimitri Simes, The Return of Russian History, FOREIGN AF., Jan. 1994, at 67.
173. For an excellent and concise description of the President's constitutional authority
authorized by the newly- ratified charter, see Herman Schwartz, Analysis of Russian Constitution
Reveals Flaws; Provisions for Judiciary Inadequate, 4 RUSSIA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP.
17 (1994).
174. As the new Constitution gives a legal framework for the development of a Russian
neofascist State, Black Hundred discusses the political framework which exists for the
development of national socialism:
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The question arises, are there any other structural components of the
Constitution that could be used to retard the growing development and
influence of the extreme right in Russia? A preliminary analysis of the
newly-ratified Constitution suggests that a legal offensive against the
propaganda and activity of extremists might be mounted by the govern-
ment. New constitutional provisions specifically prohibit associations and
propaganda that promote or induce social, racial, nationalist, or religious
conflict. Article 13(5) of the Constitution prohibits such associations:
The creation and activity of social associations whose objectives and
actions are directed towards the forcible alteration of the basic
principles of the constitutional system and the violation of the
integrity of the Russian Federation, the under-mining of the security
of the state, the creation of armed formations, or the fuelling of
social, racial, national or religious strife are prohibited. 75
Furthermore, Article 29(2) prohibits hate speech: "Propaganda or agitation
exciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and enmity is not
permitted. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic
supremacy is prohibited." 76 Of course, the prevention of such associations
and hate speech through the use of the criminal law, or as a matter of
constitutional adjudication, is problematic from a practical standpoint,
especially if those prosecuted are also elected leaders or government
officials. Indeed, such actions raise serious concerns regarding free speech."7
As an example of one such prosecution, in late January 1994, the Russian
Prosecutor General's office instituted criminal charges against Vladimir
Zhirinovsky for spreading "propaganda of war" in his autobiography The
Last Push to the South. The charges, brought pursuant to Russian Criminal
Code article 71, carried a penalty of three to eight years imprisonment.
The blueprints for a national socialism have existed for some considerable time-the
Russian national idea (as interpreted by the far right) based on a 'union between labor
and capital,' a broad political movement, and on the security forces assuming the
necessary functions of control in society.
Such national socialism derives a substantial part of its inspiration from the
ideology of a bygone era. It is Communism purged of its Marxist-internationalist
elements, anti-Western, anti-democratic, with a firm belief in specific Russian spiritual
values and a political culture. The presence of so many leading former party officials,
army and KGB generals among the leaders of the right is as striking as the survival
of so many of the old ideas.
BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 294 (citation omitted).
175. KONSTITS1A RossiIsSKoI FEDERATS [Constitution of the Russian Federation] art. 13(5),
in ROSSiISKAIA GAZETA, Nov. 10, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Russian Const.].
176. Id. art. 29(2).
177. See id. art. 29(1) ("Each person is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.") See
also Leyla Boulton, Powers of Persuasion, The Fight for Free Speech in Russia, FN. TIMES.,
Nov. 5, 1993, at 18.
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Although the Duma representative now has some form of legislative
immunity, presumably such legislative insulation would not apply to the
preelection publication of his autobiography. Interestingly, under Russian
law, criminal charges may be instituted against a parliament member so
long as the individual has not been arrested. 7
8
Free to Hate states that legal action against the ultraright represents
one of the most successful courses of actions against the strength of these
movements in Germany.179 However, Hockenos notes that other
postcommunist countries have been reluctant to use legal restrictions against
the extreme right:
So soon after the criminalization of their own ranks, democrats have
mixed feelings about applying the same measures to silence other
"unacceptable" opinions. In the absence of new legislation, many of
the present laws against "racism" and "fascism" are the very same
that were used against the democratic oppositions only a few years
ago. Confirming the democrats' worst fears, conservatives in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary have shown just how easily such bans
can be abused.'8"
For any legal effort against extremists to be even moderately successful,
the freedom of expression and other human rights of all Russians have to
be protected.'' Moreover, the reconfigured Russian Constitutional Court
and other judicial bodies must emerge as strong, moderating, and
nonpolitical institutions within the Russian government. 2 Thus more
fundamental questions are raised: Will the judiciary be willing or able to
shield the Federation from dangerous political unrest that extremists may
incite? Will the judiciary protect free speech and other human rights? And
will the judicial branch be able to impartially maintain a balance between
the competing executive and legislative branches?8 3
178. See Helen Womack, Russian Extremist Faces Charges, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 27, 1994,
at 10; Zhirinovsky Faces Criminal Charges For War Propaganda, Xinhau General Overseas
News Service, Jan. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
179. FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 302.
180. Id. at 303.
181. See Sergei Kvoalyov, Human Rights Violations in Russia Are Widespread and Flagrant,
50 CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 12, 1994, at 18.
182. The prospects for the Constitutional Court are not promising. See Leonorid Nikitinsky,
Constitutional Court In Its Former Composition Issues First Warning to President, RUSSIAN
PRESS DIG., Jan. 27, 1994, at 3.
183. Of course, the same question may be addressed to each of the newly independent States
in differing stages of constitutional development. For a description of the different constitutional
tribunals in Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania as of 1992, see
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Unfortunately, the brief history of the Russian Federation's Constitutional
Court has been filled with political intrigue and immersed in power conflicts
between Yeltsin and the last Russian Supreme Soviet.'" Following the
October 1993 coup, Yeltsin disbanded the Constitutional Court until the
adoption of a new Constitution, claiming that the Court had become a "tool
of political struggle of great danger for the state. . . ."'85 While disbanded,
the Court voted to suspend Chief Justice Zorkin for engaging in political
activities, and Yeltsin declared the High Court seat vacant. The Court
reinstated Zorkin as ajudge1s in response to pressure from Zorkin supporters
in the Federal Assembly. Under the new Constitution, membership on the
Court has increased to nineteen judges, giving the president the opportunity
to reconfigure the institution. 187 The language of the Russian Constitution
raises many questions about the government's entire judicial structure,
including fundamental questions involving eligibility for judicial office,
tenure in office, independence, and separation of powers.'
These issues are especially problematic with regard to the Constitutional
Court, which is authorized to both review8 9 and initiate legislation.1"
Incredibly, a separate constitutional law, requiring a super-majority vote
of the Federal Assembly,'9' will have to be passed by the Russian Parliament
to effectuate the operations of the Constitutional Court. As Professor Herman
Schwartz recently noted in an analysis of the new Russian charter:
The Article on the Constitutional Court is a very inadequate provision.
It sets out provisions for standing, jurisdiction, and the number of
members of the Court but almost nothing else. Although these are
indeed basic questions, there is nothing here about tenure, guarantees
Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 741
(1992).
184. See Michael A. Hiltzik, Bill of Wrongs: Constitution in Mess in Russia, L.A. TMES,
Oct. 3, 1993, at Al; Zorkin's Political Role Seen as Based on Hope for Presidency, CuRRENT
DIG. PosT SOVIET Paass, Dec. 22, 1993, at 10.
185. David Margolick, At the Bar; A Top Russian Judge, in Limbo, Testifies to the Perils
and Promise of Law Back Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at B9 (quoting Yeltsin).
186. Tamara Zamyatina, Three Judges Opposed Zorkin's Return, TASS, Jan. 26, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
187. Pursuant to the Constitution, the president submits national judges for appointment
to the Parliament's upper chamber. See Russian Const. art. 128.
188. See id. arts. 118-25.
189. Id. art. 125, 1 2-5.
190. Id. art. 104, 1.
191. There are two types of laws which may be passed by the Federal Assembly: (1) a regular
statute, which requires only majority vote of both chambers and the president's signature; and
(2) a constitutional law which requires a super-majority vote of the Federal Assembly and the
president's signature. Id. art. 105, 108, 1 2. See also Russian Federal Laws to be Worked Out
in Detail, TASS, Jan. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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of independence, and the like. This is left for a constitutional law which
.. could be difficult to enact.192
It is most unfortunate that the new Constitution left so many unanswered
questions regarding Russian courts. It remains imperative that the
Federation's Constitutional Court and its entire judicial system be
depoliticized and raised to a level of high reputation and authority. 93 As
Stephen Sestanovich, one of Laqueur's colleagues at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, has stated: "Russians have to create what they
call a 'rule of law' state, based on legal norms consistently applied."'"
Without a definitively independent, effectual, and nonpolitical judiciary,
such a "rule of law" State will be extremely difficult to establish.' 95
Even with a fully-functioning judicial system, any meaningful legal
battles against the extremists will be most difficult. Hockenos states: "[L]egal
bans and police raids address only the most visible symptoms of a much
larger social problem. Neither the far right parties nor the sentiment that
makes them popular can be abolished through criminalization, even if such
laws were strictly applied ....,, 196 It will be more than a tragic irony if
the democratic freedoms won in Russia last only until the 1996 presidential
elections, which could result in the empowerment of an extremist president
with constitutionally authoritarian powers.19' In Black Hundred, Laqueur
frames the same issue directly when he asks: "And is it not also true that
postcommunist Russia is repeating the mistake committed by Weimar -
192. Schwartz, supra note 173.
193. For an excellent article on the recent development of constitutional courts in Eastern
Europe, see Georg Brunner, Development of a Constitutional Judiciary in Eastern Europe, 18
REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 535 (1992).
194. Stephen Sestanovich, Russia Turns the Corner, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 83.
195. The lack of firmly-established legal institutions is harming all transformation efforts.
As Russian businessman Vladimir Draitser stated: "The legal infrastructure isn't in place, along
with a lot of other structures. The legal foundations for the overall change, outside the beautiful
declarations of the Constitution, just aren't there. And until they're in place, the main reform,
that of the minds of the people, won't happen[,]" quoted in Steven Erlanger, Inflation and Unpaid
Bills Haunt Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at A9.
196. FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 303.
197. As Professor Molly Warner Lien states:
Many western commentators have regarded the passage of the constitution as the one
saving grace of the election. After all, they reason, notwithstanding the troubling level
of support for the rabid nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Yeltsin at least has strong
power to effect his reforms. The problem is that Yeltsin will not always be president.
If his reforms have not succeeded by the summer of 1996, there is the specter that
the new president may prove to be one who will be a far greater abuser of power than
Yeltsin.
Molly Warner Lien, In Post-Election Russian, There's Bad News And Bad News, CMi. TRiB.,
Dec. 24, 1993, at 13.
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giving absolute freedom to the enemies of democracy?"'9' Thus, Russia's
constitutional dilemma becomes obvious: Every authoritarian act, legal or
illegal, that Yeltsin commits in the name of pressing economic and political
reforms or suppressing extremists only becomes a political precedent which
may be used to justify worse abuse by the next elected president.
Although a few commentators continue to depict Zhirinovsky as a
clownish, straw man against whom Yeltsin may win political points,' 99 the
extremist politician now has a solid political base from which to mount
a campaign for the Russian presidency in 1996.m Indeed, as Zhirinovsky
withdrew his candidacy for the position of Speaker of the Duma, he flatly
stated, "I am getting ready for the presidential elections."'" Just as Hitler
and the Nazis effectively used the 1930s media technology of radio and
loudspeakers to inspire a humiliated and impoverished people, Zhirinovsky
and other extremists have proven their ability to use television for mass
appeal and effect.' In a June 1993 interview, following the release of Black
Hundred, Laqueur discusses Russia's political future and Zhirinovsky's
political fortunes:
So far there are dozens of disparate extremist nationalist groups. But
in a way the current situation resembles Germany in 1920, where there
was a great deal of resentment on the extreme right, but only small
organized groups-until a single man appeared on the scene who pulled
it all together.
We may try to dismiss the nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky-who
has threatened to take Finland and Poland back into the Russian
empire-as a bit of a clown, but he is a successful clown. As he likes
to point out, he got as many votes in the 1991 Russian presidential
election as the population of Switzerland. If the economic situation
continues to deteriorate, it will create nostalgia for the "good old days."
If the democrats fail politically, and if anti-Russianism grows outside
Russia and creates a stream of refugees, then support for the right
could sharply increase)°3
198. BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 294.
199. See William Satire, Panic Over Mr Z, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A29.
200. See Jill Smolowe, Russia: No Reason to Cheer, TIME, Dec. 27, 1993, at 34; Daniel
Sneider, Russians Spurn Reformers, Embrace Authoritarianism, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
14, 1993, at 1.
201. Zhirinovsky Withdraws Candidacy To Head Duma to Prepare For Presidency, Agence
France Presse, Jan. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See Hockstader,
supra note 143, at AI.
202. See Vladimir Klimenko & Cynthia Scharf, Zhirinovsky's Success Draws Disturbing
Parallels to Hitler, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 1994, at 22.
203. Jeff Trimble, Danger on the Far Right, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 21, 1993,
at 48 (interview with Walter Laqueur).
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Much more serious than a one-time protest, the root of the vote for
the Liberal Democratic Party and Zhirinovsky appears deeply imbedded
within a "dispirited Russia." In specifically assessing the political prospects
of a Zhirinovsky-type presidential candidate, it is important at least to
consider the very pessimistic views of Russian human rights advocates Serje
Grigoriantz2° and Tair Tairov.' Tairov suggests that while Hitler "invented
himself," it was the Russian people who invented Zhirinovsky. This
conclusion seems to take the next logical step from Black Hundred's
prefacing statement regarding "Black Hundredism," referring not just to
a specific political group or party but to "a matter of morals and character
which has deeper roots: It is rooted in the primordial darkness of the Russian
soul, its unenlightened deposits. '
III. THE CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE EAST
EUROPEAN MARSHALL PLAN
For many years after helping craft the first Marshall Plan for the Truman
Administration in the late 1940s, Will Clayton continued to remind U.S.
citizens that their own security and economic welfare was intimately linked
with their concern for the security of Europe: "We must also adjust our
thinking and acting in the political and economic fields to the needs and
204. Victoria Pope, A new face of the old Russia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 3, 1994,
at 32.
205. Speaking at the Hebrew University of Israel, Grigoriantz stated:
The present situation is much more dangerous than the political leaders in Moscow
or in the West believe .... The West does not understand the mentality of people
like Zhirinovsky and does not take his territorial ambitions seriously or the implications
of his political power. The communist-fascist presence in the Duma is an accurate
reflection of public opinion in Russia, especially in the provinces. They receive all
their funding from the same sources as the old-time communists. More than a third
of the army also supports Zhirinovsky. Sooner or later, President Boris Yeltsin will
be made totally ineffective or there will be an actual putsch. At that point, Zhirinovsky
will begin a war to gain territory."
Bathseva Tsur, Former Dissident Predicts Zhirinovsky's Russian Takeover, JERUSALEM POST,
Jan. 18, 1994, at 1.
206. Tairov, head of the Moscow branch of Amnesty International, stated:
I think Zhirinovsky's success in the December elections is a very serious thing. I do
not think it is for just one or two years. I think this is a very general, very solid, very
basic turn in Russian politics.... I think Zhirinovsky will come to power one day.
If the elections were tomorrow for the Russian president, of course, Yeltsin would
lose to Zhirinovsky. No one can stop him. There is no force, unfortunately, that can
stop him."
Joe Murray, Nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky 'invented by the Russian people'?, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Jan. 14, 1994, at A13.
207. BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at xvi (quoting SEMYON FRANK, NRAvSTVENNYI
VODORAZDEL V RUSSKOI REVOLIUTSn1 (1919)).
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interests of the free world rather than selfish interests." The truth of this
statement rings out clearly in this present period of substantial political
and economic turmoil in Eastern Europe.
The immediate development and implementation of a full-scale recovery
program for the newly independent States may be the West's only chance
to recapture what Professor Jeffrey Sachs terms as "one of history's great
chances." 9 The current program of Western aid and technical assistance
is simply not reaching or improving the lives of the 400 million Russians
and the citizens of other newly independent States.210 In fact, the trifling
amount of actual assistance, which has come after bold and braggart promises
of significant Western help, has bred understandable resentment among
the Russian people. Of course, the West's incompetence in lending such
aid fuels extremists' nationalist rhetoric regarding the need for a renewed
imperialistic foreign policy. 2 1 Having assured itself that it has won the
Cold War, the West now appears complacently willing to lose the peace.
Laqueur expressed a similar realpolitik understanding of the Russian
situation:
Nevertheless, I think the United States has to be more on guard.
American policy rests on the assumption that Russia no longer is a
danger. There is a feeling that the cold war is over and that now that
Yeltsin has won, the problems are solved. Actually, the situation has
become much more complicated. Nuclear bombs have not been
abolished. There could be civil wars, which would intensify nationalist
backlash. The danger now exists because of Russia's weakness, not
its strength.212
208. FOSSEDAL, supra note 2, at 265.
209. Sachs pessimistically suggests that the West has betrayed Russia and its own geopolitical
interests: "'We have let slip one of history's great chances.'" He maintains that this betrayal
eventually could lead to an economic disaster that would lead to the rise of a Hitler-like dictator,
and he reminds Western leaders of the post-Cold War reality: "They still have the largest army,
the largest arsenal of conventional weapons and the largest nuclear stockpile in the world." Anthony
Flint, Yeltsin's US adviser fears opportunity lost; 'Shock therapy' economist quits, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 1.
210. Of the aid that was promised and allocated, little has been actually dispersed by world
financial institutions. Indeed, only two billion dollars of the paltry $17 billion that the World
Bank and IMF intended to lend Russia was actually released by the end of 1993. Jeffrey Sachs,
The Reformers' Tragedy, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1994, at D17. See Richard Boudreaux, U.S. Aid
Improves Few Russian Lives, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at A14.
211. A few days after resigning his post as advisor to the Russian government, which had
turned against reform, Sachs appraised the West's failure: "We promised to help. We made
commitments, even specific commitments, $28 billion for 1993. We delivered almost nothing,
... So the shortfall of our actions relative to our rhetoric and our promises did a great deal of
damage to the reformers." Economist Jeffrey Sachs Concerned with Russian Economy, CNN
Show: News 3:10 pm ET, Jan. 26, 1994, trans. # 535-2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
212. Jeff Trimble, supra note 203 at 48 (interview with Walter Laqueur).
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A. Insuring Final Victory in the Cold War
It is in the strategic self-interest of the United States and its Western
allies to immediately commit substantial resources to aid all Eastern
European States in their difficult transformation to independent, market
democracies.213 In particular, Russia and other members of the Common-
wealth of Independent States should be given unconditional assurances of
comprehensive, collaborative support to guarantee success in their historic
attempts to convert nonimperial, market regimes." 4 The isolationist reaction
of some U.S. politicians in taking any opportunity215 to attack recovery
efforts for the newly independent States of Europe 21 6 ignores the long-term
costs inherent in failing to render such assistance.27 Trillions of dollars
were spent in fighting the Cold War; it would be foolishly penurious for
the United States not to lead the world in working with the newly
independent States in developing and financing a comprehensive recovery
program to ensure the final victory and guarantee preservation of the peace.2 8
Sir Fred Catherwood, a member of the European Parliament, has termed
the current World Bank and IMF assistance plan, which was designed to
213. See Flora Lewis, A Bigger, Better Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A21.
214. London University Professor Jacek Rostowski recently described the West's strategic
interests in aiding Russia's economic transformation:
In spite of the soothing voices of the experts, it is time to start panicking about Russia.
There is still time to stop the fascists from taking power. But if they do, the west will,
at the very least, have to engage in an extremely expensive policy of containment.
Just as a botched peace after the first world war led to the second, so a botched peace
after the cold war will lead to a second cold war, unless Russia's transition to a
reasonably prosperous and stable society is managed successfully.
It is thus of vital western strategic interest to help Russian achieve this transition.
Jacek Rostowski, Personal View: Why the West Must Plug Russia's Gap, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1994, at 19. Professor Rostowski is most critical of allowing the IMF and the World Bank to
handle Western assistance efforts. Id. See also Jeffrey D. Sachs & Charles Wyplosz, Personal
View: How the West Should Help Russian Reform, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at 17.
215. For example, consider the less than relevant attacks made against continuing the limited
aid presently targeted for Russia, after a "mole" was discovered in the Central Intelligence Agency
who had spied for the Soviet Union for years. See Spy Scandal Raises Policy Questions; Lawmakers
Challenge Aid to Russia, CHI. Tlun., Feb. 27, 1994, at 23.
216. See Hearings of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Federal News Service, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. See also Marilyn Greene, Senators say aid must reach the right Russians, U.S.A. TODAY,
Jan. 25, 1994, at 6A.
217. See, e.g., Vladimir Klimenko, A Window on a Troubled Soul, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1993, at B7.
218. Too many commentators and politicians spend more energy and time on concerns
regarding who is to blame for the situation than they do on thinking about solutions. See, e.g.,
R.C. Longworth, If Russia turns sour, who's the bad guy?, CHI. TRIa., Jan. 30, 1994, at D1.
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"keep Russian aid off Western budgets," as the "kind of short-sightedness
that produced the Versailles Treaty,"2 9 and which then gave rise to Hitler:
What better investment to end the Cold War, do away with nuclear
weapons, tap Russia's riches for them and for us, and remove the threat
of a resentful, nationalist Russian president in charge of the nuclear
arsenal. But we are fast running out of time!
An East European Recovery Program, modeled after the first Marshall
Plan,' could help ensure peace, could eventually promote U.S. trade with
previously untapped markets, and could secure in perpetuity the preeminence
of the United States in the global community. A second Marshall Plan could
actually come to be viewed as the final completion of the first European
recovery effort because Stalin refused to allow the Soviet Union, or any
of the "Soviet Block" States, to participate in the first Marshall Plan."
B. Listening in 1994 to Secretary of State Marshall's
1947 Harvard Commencement Address
Although there are significant differences between the present economic
and political crisis in Eastern Europe and those that existed in post-World
War H Western Europe, it is perhaps enlightening to consider again excerpts
from Secretary of State George Marshall's famed June 5, 1947 Harvard
Commencement address.2 2 Just as U.S. citizens today must be more fully
educated as to the grave nature of the genuine economic and social crisis
faced by Eastern European States, Marshall prefaced his address with a
call for the "gentlemen" graduates of Harvard to understand fully the
profoundly serious nature of the economic and political situation in post-War
Europe:
I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious.
That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty
is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very
219. Sir Fred Catherwood, MEP, Letter: Invest now in Russia, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 27, 1994,
at 21.
220. For background on the European Recovery Program, popularly known as the Marshall
Plan, see ROBERT DONOVAN, THE SECOND VICTORY: THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE POSTWAR
REVIVAL OF EUROPE (1987); DuLLEs, supra note 1; JOHN GIMBEL, THE ORIGINS OF THE MARSHALL
PLAN (1967); THEODORE A. WILSON, THE MARSHALL PLAN (1977).
221. In addition to declaring the Soviet Union and Soviet-zone Germany's nonparticipation,
Stalin quickly "persuaded" Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Rumania,
and Yugoslavia not to join, or to withdraw, from participation.
222. Excerpts from the Marshall speech, as presented in this article, are slightly altered
to emphasize its timeliness to the present troubled times. For example, "East" is added in brackets
before "European," "Cold" before "War," and "Soviet" replaces "Nazi."
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mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio [and television]
make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear
appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country
are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them
to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering
peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in
connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.213
Marshall attempted to explain how the entire industrial infrastructure
of Europe, especially of the vanquished enemy Germany, had been
corrupted and destroyed by a wartime command economy. Certainly, the
same analysis applies to the former socialist States today, whose centrally-
controlled, government-planned, totally-insulated economies must be
transformed into dynamic, capitalistic economies, capable of competing
in a hypertechnological, global marketplace:
[I]t has become obvious during recent months that this visible
destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire
fabric of [East] European economy. For the past [70] years conditions
have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for [Cold] war
and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all
aspects of national economies .... Under the arbitrary and destruc-
tive [Soviet] rule, ... [l]ongstanding commercial ties, private
institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies
disappeared. The breakdown of the business structure of [East]
Europe during the [Cold] war was complete.2 '
Just as Marshall recognized that Germans, Greeks, French, Italians,
and all other Europeans not under control of the Soviets first needed stable
currencies to control inflation after World War II, the East European
Recovery Plan must assure that the peoples of Russia, the Ukraine,
Georgia, and all the other newly independent States will also have stable
currencies. Again and again, the history of economics teaches the harsh
lesson that an unstable currency leads to devastating hyperinflation:
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the
confidence of the [East] European people in the economic future of
their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and
the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to
exchange their product for currencies the continuing value of which
is not open to question. 225
223. CHARLES S. MEE, JR., THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE LAUNCHING OF THE PAX AMERICANA
271 (1984).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 272.
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Marshall forcefully articulated both the economic and political self-
interest of the United States in forming, with former European enemies
and allies alike, a European Recovery Program which would increase
international trade and build democratic institutions. In Eastern Europe,
the United States has the same dualist foreign policy interests in 1994:
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the
possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation iof
the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United
States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States
should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the [development] of
normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no
political stability and no assured peace.2"
The Marshall speech next recognized and spoke to the humanitarian
nature of the mission undertaken, that human lives were at stake, and that
any recovery program would be seen as reprehensible if not both compre-
hensive and successful. Similarly, the East European Marshall plan
proposed must first and foremost be concerned with reaching the most
desperate and displaced persons in each of the newly independent States
requesting assistance. 7 It was recently reported that medical supplies are
almost nonexistent in many places in the former Soviet Union and that
food shortages are commonplace. 2n In short, the second Marshall Plan
must, like the first, "give promise of doing the whole job,"229 while
assuring the world:
Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the
revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the
emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions
can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a
piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this
Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather
than a mere palliative.23
226. Id.
227. Of course, food sources and medical supplies are the threshold concern in very
depressed areas. For a recent report summarizing eight experts' opinions regarding food supply
and agricultural reform in the Commonwealth States, see REMY JURENANA, U.S. AGRICULTURAL
ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT
(March 1994).
228. Bill Castell, Striken East Needs a Safety Net, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 25, 1994,
at 33.
229. HARRY BAYARD PRICE, THE MARSHALL PLAN ITS MEANING 23 (1955).
230. MEE, supra note 223, at 272.
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The United States and all countries in alliance in this effort must be
prepared to defend the integrity of the East European Marshall Plan,
morally and politically, against extremist groups and politicians, just as
the first recovery effort was defended against these same elements. The
West must brace for nothing short of virulent reaction from the extremists
and nationalists, who know that the second Marshall Plan's success will
likely' result in their political demise. It should be stated that:
Any Government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will
find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States
Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery
of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, govern-
ments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human
misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will
encounter the opposition of the United States.
23
'
Most importantly, Marshall's speech recognized the need for total
cooperation and resolution among the United States and European States.
For the success of an East European Marshall Plan, such unity of purpose
and effect is even more important today. The threshold for any such
program is that it be an East European program, with carefully tailored
plans to meet the unique needs of each participating State,232 because all
the newly independent States are in different stages of transformation.233
The second Marshall Plan must be held open to any country wishing
to participate fully in the effort:
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place [East]
Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the [Eastern]
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from [East] Europe.
The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting
of a European program and of later support of such a program so far
as it may be practical for us to do so.
234
231. Id.
232. For a description of the different experiences between the various East European States
under communism, see ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOHN MICKLEWRIGHT, ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (1993).
233. For example, many of the former "satellite" States have already, through incredible
sacrifice and hard work, achieved a significant level of fiscal and currency stability. If they
decide to participate in the second Marshall Plan, such States would be ready for more advanced
recovery assistance.
234. MEE, supra note 223, at 273.
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It would be a grievous mistake for the West to recognize any zone of
"economic influence" by Moscow over any other State on the continent.
In the event that antireformist forces take full control of Russia's gov-
ernment235 at the time of the second Marshall plan's implementation and
Russia rejects full participation in the plan, the West should be prepared
to defend the right of all the other newly independent States who may
choose to participate.
The practical politics involved in the congressional passage of such
a recovery proposal for Eastern Europe dictate that the United States will
have to convince its citizens that their share of the expenditure for such
a recovery program is consistent not only with the United States's self-
interest, but also with the responsibility which history has thrust upon
people fortunate enough to live in the West. The United States will have
to accept that the fiscal cost of final victory in the Cold War will be
substantial - the total cost in the hundreds of billions of dollars. After
World War II, President Truman had the vision and sense to invest in
peace and the courage to present the bill to U.S. citizens.236 As Truman's
Secretary of State said:
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United
States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of
the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political
passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a
willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsi-
bility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the diffi-
culties I have outlined can and will be overcome. 37
While accepting the leadership for and rightful share of the financial
burden of the East European Marshall Plan, the United States should
concurrently share this responsibility with Western Europe, Japan, and
other beneficiaries of the first Marshall Plan. What better way for the
recipients of the first Marshall Plan's assistance to begin celebrating the
235. See Tim Zimmermann & Douglas Stanglin, Who will reforn?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 31, 1994, at 11.
236. Truman also had the benefit of Secretary Marshall's eager desire to use his persuasive
abilities in selling the plan to U.S. citizens and utilizing private support groups. Marshall
described this effort: "I flew thousands of miles a week, following through on everything that
happened in this country. ... I worked on that as hard as though I was running for the Senate
or the presidency .... It was just a struggle from start to finish." DULLES, supra note 1, at vii,
viii. George Marshall was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for this work, which he
accepted on behalf of the American people. Id. at viii. The successful development and
acceptance of an East European Marshall Plan will require similar leadership in both the
executive and legislative branches of the government.
237. MEE, supra note 223, at 273.
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Golden Anniversary of the successful European Recovery Program than
to pledge their total support to the East European Marshall Plan?
C. Undoing Seventy Years of Economic and Political "Doublethink"
An East European Marshall Plan will do far more than just provide
investment assistance and encourage international business ventures.
Indeed, it could provide Eastern Europe with substantial resources and
assistance concentrating on improving production capacity, ensuring
currency stability, instituting inflation controls, and developing an
intellectual infrastructure for competing in the twenty-first century world
market.
As stated, a comprehensive, well-developed plan for achieving and
maintaining currency stability23 an East European Payments Union is the
first and most important goal for the Plan.239 James M. Silberman, who
served as head of the Productivity Assistance Program of the first Marshall
Plan, recently outlined some practical aspects of such a recovery program.
In the January 1994 issue of Foreign Affairs, Silberman described the
limited nature of Western investment assistance to former communist
countries, which does not even provide the knowledge and training
necessary to convert these countries' industrial bases to free market
industry: "This approach is not working fast enough. The average FSU/EE
(former Soviet Union/Eastern Europe) citizen has barely enough money
to survive, a very limited choice of things to buy, and dim future prospects
for more lucrative employment."' As was the case under the first
Marshall Plan, Silberman envisions a massive study-abroad plan so that
"[h]uge numbers of people from government, management and labor [are]
exposed to new ideas on an unprecedented scale and within a very few
years."'" Silberman forcefully argues that without such a massive
educational effort, the Russian people cannot be liberated from a "cen-
tralized, militarized command economy cut off for more than 70 years
from world markets and the worldwide flow of technological
informations." 2
Silberman's thesis deserves special consideration and development in
the construction of an East European Recovery Program. The program
238. See GAIL E. MAKINEN, A CURRENCY BOARD AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A CENTRAL
BANK: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT (March 1994).
239. See Boyden Gray, When Currencies Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at All.
240. James Silberman et al., Jump-Starting Ex-Communist Economies; A Leaf from the
Marshall Plan, FOREIGN An'., JanJFeb. 1994, at 21.
241. Id.
242. 1d.
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must be structured to accomplish the difficult mission of releasing
individuals dominated by the Soviet Union for three generations. This
domination has bred a political and social pathology susceptible to the
siren call of extremists from both the right and left. Indeed, after securing
basic financial security for the newly independent States, perhaps the most
challenging and important mission of the second Marshall Plan will be to
forcefully challenge what Vaclav Havel termed the "living of the lie," the
intellectual corruption of generations of peoples by Soviet "doublethink '' 43
in economic, political, social, and personal relations. This doublethink is
well represented in the attack of lies that the communists waged against
the first Marshall Plan.' The West must directly challenge this, and assist
all of Europe in a successful mission of what Havel describes as "longing
for truth" with the implementation of a second Marshall Plan. Free to Hate
capsulated the challenge facing the West in this regard:
When the revolutions of 1989 brought down the East bloc
regimes, they swept away the facade of historical half-truths, dis-
tortions, and lies upon which the ruling elites justified their power.
Understandably, the East Europeans' "longing for truth," as Havel
phrased it, has led them to reexamine their histories, to recover what
was valuable but has been lost. In their quest to recapture that "truth,"
however, the Eastern Europeans have accepted new historical fictions,
no less ominous in their implications for democracy."
243. As defined by George Orwell:
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them. The Party intellectual knows in which
direction his memories must be altered; he therefore knows that is playing tricks with
reality; but by the exercise of doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is not
violated. The process has to be conscious, or it would not be carried out with
sufficient precision, but it also has to be unconscious, or it would bring with it a
feelings of falsity and hence of guilt.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 176 (1992).
Eric Fromm, in an Afterward written for 1984, stated: "Another important point in Orwell's
discussion is closely related to doublethink, namely that in a successful manipulation of the mind
the person is no longer saying the opposite of what he thinks, but he thinks the opposite of what
is true." Id. at 265. See Williams, The Struggle Continues, supra note 4.
244. Cominform's October 1947 manifesto stated:
The Truman-Marshall plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general world
plan of political expansion being realized by the United States of American [sic] in
all parts of the world .... The aggressors of yesterday - the capitalist tycoons
Germany and Japan - are being prepared by the United States of America for a new
role - as tools for the imperialistic policy in Europe and Asia of the United States
of America.
DULLES, supra note 1, at 31.
245. FREE TO HATE, supra note 63, at 13.
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First, U.S. leaders must challenge their own provincial nae-sayers who
view the East's current problems as insurmountable, or who are ready to
dismiss Russia and much of the rest of Eastern Europe as alien countries
without democratic, market traditions. Further, just as the first Marshall
Plan was defended against domestic enemies who pejoratively termed it
"Operation Rathole,"' the East European Marshall Plan must be supported
by the private sector. Just as the first recovery effort was sold to "a
reluctant public and a skeptical Congress"' 7 by the private "Committee
for the Marshall Plan," a private organization should be founded to lobby
for a second recovery effort, emphasizing the unparalleled economic
potential that the fully-developed Eastern European markets offer.' In
the public sector, a first step toward development of such a recovery effort
would be to emulate the procedures established by Secretary of Commerce
W. Averell Harriman for the first Marshall Plan and empanel a national
commission to promptly, yet expansively, study "the limits within which
the United States may safely and wisely plan to extend"'' 9 assistance to
Eastern Europe.
CONCLUSION
Whether Zhirinovsky or other extremists in Eastern Europe will prove
to be "a Fuhrer, a duce who together with like-minded followers [can
create] a dynamic mass movement," and use the "objective conditions"
of "economic crisis" and "breakdown or absence of democratic institu-
tions ''25° to mobilize a neofascist coup, will ultimately depend on the
peoples of Eastern Europe. Laqueur states in the final paragraph of Black
Hundred:
Who, then will help Russia in its present predicament? The reply,
paradoxically, is contained in Eugene Pottier's song that was for
decades the official anthem of the Soviet Union: Help will not come
from outside; neither God nor a master (ni dieu, ni maitre) will bring
salvation. It can come only through the Russian people's own efforts,
their good sense, and their fortitude in adversity."
246. See Will Clayton, Is the Marshall Plan "Operation Rathole"?, SAT. EVENING POST,
Nov. 29, 1947, at 26.
247. DULLES, supra note 1, at xv.
248. See Paul Klebnikov, Russia: The Ultimate Emerging Market, FORTUNE, Feb. 14, 1994,
at 88.
249. DULLES, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of President Truman upon creating various
foreign aid committees, including the Harriman Committee which had a diverse membership
from business, the academy, and government).
250. BLACK HUNDRED, supra note 17, at 293.
251. Id. at 296.
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Although the world can ultimately only hope for the development of
strong democratic institutions in all the newly independent States of
Europe, the United States and its allies can provide a generous, creative,
and comprehensive program of recovery assistance. The immediate
development and implementation of a full-scale East European Marshall
Plan is the very least that the West can do to ease the profound economic
and social crises that the peoples of Russia and the other newly inde-
pendent States of Eastern Europe are experiencing.
From a strategic standpoint, the West must accept that the final victory
in the Cold War will only come about through the implementation of a
recovery program that will ensure a successful market transformation for
each of the Eastern European economies. Instead of turning away from
the face of the extremist evil that Black Hundred and Free to Hate expose,
the West must unite with courageous democrats in the East and forcefully
confront these forces through a collaborative program of recovery. The
quality and character of twentienth century Europe and the peace of the
world may well depend on the decisions made both in the East and West
during the next two years regarding East European recovery. Facing an
economic, political, and intellectual challenge of such proportions, the
leaders of the United States and the rest of the West would also do well
to listen again to former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who
was unafraid to speak the truth with respect to such "anxious and baffling
times." In speaking of the descending "iron curtain" from the Baltic to the
Adriatic, the common nature of the extremist threats of communism and
fascism, and the unconditional responsibility of the West to help forge a
"new unity in Europe," Churchill noted:
It is a solemn moment for the American Democracy. For with
primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to
the future. If you look around you, you must feel now the sense of
duty done but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level
of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining for both
our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring
upon us all the long reproaches of the after-time. z2
The clarity of Churchill's challenge to the West rings as true in 1994 as
it did almost fifty years ago. The Iron Curtain speech, which is often
said to have heralded the beginning of the Cold War, holds the secret
weapon for the West's final victory in this struggle: "The safety of the
world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be
252. DIANE RAVITCH & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, THE DEMOCRACY READER 85, 86 (1992)
(quoting Winston Churchill).
Michigan Journal of International Law
permanently outcast. ' ' 1 3 Although a comprehensive recovery program
for Eastern Europe would be extraordinarily expensive to sponsor and
difficult to implement, the West has a historical responsibility to bear
this burden in an attempt to secure peace for the future generations of
both East and West.
253. Id. at 88.
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